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Colloquy 
DO STATES SOCIALIZE? 
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ† 
Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’s “How to Influence 
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law”1 achieves 
the rare trifecta of solid academic scholarship. Their work is first, 
exceedingly ambitious: they seek to provide a new explanation for 
why states behave that goes beyond carrots and sticks. Second, in the 
tradition of some of the best contemporary work in public 
international law, it brings interdisciplinary insights into a field still 
dominated by an emphasis on black letter doctrine. Goodman and 
Jinks accomplish this integration through a sophisticated 
understanding of the various nonlegal disciplines sought to be 
engaged, particularly sociology.2 Third, their work is situated in a 
burgeoning field of empirically oriented scholarship on compliance 
that aspires for both better description and better prescription. 
Goodman and Jinks push the envelope of compliance studies by 
going beyond the best work in the field, that of Dean Harold Koh and 
Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes, to elicit a new set of 
inquiries. At the same time, Goodman and Jinks’s work is engaged. It 
is not theory for the sake of theory. The authors seek to influence 
policymakers—such as those who conclude and implement human 
rights treaties—by addressing issues of direct policy relevance, and 
they obviously have a policy agenda themselves, namely, to use 
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 1.  Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). 
 2.  Even when it comes to describing the existing mechanisms for compliance, which they 
acknowledge have been developed by other scholars, Goodman and Jinks recognize the 
complexity of the dynamic processes at work. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173–81 (2003) 
(describing the many dependent and independent variables that must be taken into account 
when empirically analyzing the effects of human rights treaties and explaining the complexities 
that a theoretical model ought to take into account). Their Table I contains a refreshingly 
supple description of tools of influence that are most often described in more mechanistic terms. 
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 655 tbl.1. 
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international law to help to reduce human rights violations.3 They are 
well aware that the lives of human beings are affected, both positively 
and negatively, by the phenomena they are both describing and 
hoping to affect. 
Their article is synoptic, perhaps necessarily so for a piece that 
aspires to do so much. But the high level of generality at which the 
article is pitched prompts a rich set of inquiries. 
Goodman and Jinks’s reliance on socialization as a theory of 
compliance needs case studies to provide context and further nuance. 
The bare bones of their theory need to be clothed. Some texture 
might be provided by historical accounts of the growth of particular 
human rights regimes. Professor Brian Simpson’s work on the history 
and genesis of the European Convention of Human Rights, based on 
exhaustive research of recently opened archives within Great Britain, 
serves as the basis for this critique.4 Simpson has recently attempted 
to explain the British approach to negotiating and ultimately ratifying 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention). Simpson’s account of why states 
conclude human rights treaties starts from a very different premise 
than does Goodman and Jinks’s, and his historical approach provides 
a rich complement to the empiricism of political scientists like 
Professor Andrew Moravcsik.5 
Simpson’s conclusions highlight both the potential utility, as well 
as the limitations, of Goodman and Jinks’s concept of socialization. 
For Simpson, general accounts that purport to explain why states 
behave as they do are only of value when they are based on case 
studies grounded in the actions of particular state actors within 
particular states, as with respect to their reactions to the prospect of 
adhering to certain treaties. 
Simpson tries to explain why a liberal state that had just won a 
war against a genocidal regime nonetheless nearly voted against the 
draft Genocide Convention when that proposed treaty was adopted 
 
 3. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 629 (“The question whether international law 
can promote human rights norms may be recast, in an important sense, as how human rights 
regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social influence.”). 
 4. A.W. Brian Simpson, Britain and the Genocide Convention, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 5. 
 5. Both Simpson and Moravcsik have dealt with the origins of the European system of 
human rights. See generally A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: 
BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2001); Andrew Moravcsik, The 
Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 
217 (2000). 
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by the UN General Assembly in 1948—and why it took that state 
over twenty years to ratify that treaty (which it finally did in April of 
1970).6 Simpson sets out to explain, in the context of a state that was 
clearly not attempting to protect its future options to commit 
genocide, what Goodman and Jinks might describe as a two decades-
long failure of socialization. But Simpson’s account also provides 
some support for those inclined to see the glass as half full. His is also 
a story of why socialization ultimately works. After all, British 
government officials were eventually induced to ratify a treaty that 
many of them had initially regarded as a useless tool against evil 
regimes bent on genocide that could present bureaucratic nightmares 
for law-abiding regimes like their own. 
In many ways, Simpson’s case study provides solid, historically 
grounded support for Goodman and Jinks’s threefold division among 
compliance mechanisms, as well as for their favored third method: 
acculturation. Simpson describes distinct and sometimes colorful 
personalities within rival British government offices (the Home 
Office and the Foreign Office), each attempting to influence overall 
British treaty policy and each succeeding or retreating at critical 
moments of decision. Although Simpson focuses on each office’s 
distinct bureaucratic preoccupations—as well as those of the 
individuals within them—much of his story can be re-told through the 
lens of the three mechanisms to induce state compliance delineated 
by Goodman and Jinks. Advocates of persuasion could see in 
Simpson’s tale the impact of interest group politics within a polity, 
including the role of Jewish organizations and the preoccupations of 
certain lawyers in the Home Office sensitive to particular 
constituencies. Observers receptive to coercive models of compliance, 
especially realists like Professor John Mearsheimer, would see, on the 
contrary, a cautionary tale that shows the fundamental irrelevance of 
human rights treaties. After all, not only did it take Britain two 
decades to ratify this treaty but, as Simpson explains, since ratification 
in 1970, the only extradition request that has been presented to the 
British government was in the case of former Chilean dictator 
Augusto Pinochet and, in that instance, the genocide charges were 
eventually dropped.7 
 
 6. Simpson, supra note 4, at 62. 
 7. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 148 (1999). 
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Goodman and Jinks presumably would put Simpson’s case study 
to different use. They would focus, instead, on the status-oriented 
concerns that ultimately drove the British to approve the Genocide 
Convention when it was first proposed in 1948 and, ultimately, to 
ratify it many years later. As Simpson tells the story, British officials 
ultimately declined to dissent when the Genocide Convention was 
first proposed (even though the draft treaty was, in the view of many 
of its lawyers, severely flawed) because those responsible for casting 
the vote did not want to be seen as the sole dissenters. With respect to 
ratification years later, proponents within the British Foreign Office 
stressed the need to avoid embarrassing the nation. Among the 
reasons cited for ratifying the treaty—which was by then widely in 
force—was the fear that a continued failure would make the state 
appear insensitive to the horrors of the Holocaust and expose its 
government to charges of anti-Semitism. The British government 
officials who finally prevailed argued that ratification of the Genocide 
Convention was necessary for Britain’s “international prestige” and 
that Britain could no longer afford to be counted among the last 
holdouts, along with pariahs such as apartheid-era South Africa. 
Socialization, it can plausibly be argued, provides a key rationale for 
Britain’s stance vis-à-vis the Genocide Convention. 
At the same time, Simpson’s case study highlights matters that 
are not addressed by Goodman and Jinks but that would be familiar 
to anyone who has served in government. The saga of Britain and the 
Genocide Convention, rife with interdepartmental turf battles, is rich 
in Weberian insights. Simpson highlights, in a way that Goodman and 
Jinks do not, the role and significance of bureaucracy as an 
independent factor. He shows how distinct government offices are 
captured by certain interests, exhibit path-dependent behavior, and 
prefer the status quo—how, for example, the British Home Office 
predictably responds, as it always has, to parliamentary concerns, 
while the Foreign Office worries more about the potential impact on 
its network of extradition treaties and the country’s relative standing 
abroad. Simpson’s history demonstrates how government 
bureaucracies work and how those willing to engage in delay can 
succeed for a very long time through familiar paper shuffling tactics. 
In addition, Simpson highlights the force and relevance of 
distinct personalities. His narrative showcases the role and stamina of 
individuals, from low-level lawyers to political leaders, each with 
varying abilities to persuade others to adopt his point of view. 
Simpson’s cast of characters ranges from a persistent Jewish member 
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of Parliament (who obstinately refuses to let the convention die) to a 
young Philip Allott, long before he became a prominent international 
law academic (who is instrumental in discouraging his country from 
filing proposed treaty reservations). Ultimately, ratification requires a 
reversal of policy, brought on by a new Labour government, to move 
more conservative bureaucrats to action. 
Finally, classic lawyerly concerns play a prominent role in 
Simpson’s history. The objections raised by government lawyers, both 
at the time of the convention’s initial drafting and whenever 
ratification was subsequently seriously contemplated, presented a 
serious obstacle for advocates of the convention. In 1948, these legal 
concerns focused on the possibility that the convention would extend 
to attacks directed at cultural icons (namely, cultural genocide), as 
well as uncertainty about whether the treaty would criminalize, 
retroactively, acts committed by Britain during the colonial era. 
Later, the legal impediments included the burden of drafting detailed 
implementing legislation and the need to establish a process for 
handling anticipated cases in which the British government would 
face a request for extradition from a state that was extracting a 
political vendetta and not advancing a good faith claim of genocide.8 
The factors that Simpson’s history emphasizes do not play a role 
in Goodman and Jinks’s account. Yet bureaucratic politics, personal 
leadership (or lack thereof), and positive law would all appear to be 
part of the necessary description of how and why Britain hesitated 
but ultimately joined this significant human rights regime. 
Presumably, all three factors will continue to play a role in the future 
 
 8. Interestingly, Simpson’s account does not suggest that one of the obstacles to Britain’s 
participation in the genocide regime was the “vagueness” of the underlying legal rules. Cf. 
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 676 (suggesting that one of the characteristics of human 
rights treaties is that they are notoriously vague compared with other legal domains). On the 
contrary, it was the relative precision of the Genocide Convention—its requirement that 
extradition requests not be denied—that was regarded as a principal obstacle. On reflection, 
human rights treaties are not necessarily more imprecise than any other treaties. Many of the 
requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, are 
comparable to or even more, rather than less, precise than the general nondiscrimination norm 
that is the basis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and would appear to share 
many of the enforcement difficulties of the typical human rights regime. (Not all trade rights are 
self-enforcing and many—from non-discrimination to respect for intellectual property rights—
are systematically under-enforced; as with human rights, not all countries are able to rely on 
reciprocity as a reliable enforcement tool.) Goodman and Jinks’s larger premise—that human 
rights regimes share unique characteristics—is worth re-examining. Other treaty regimes, from 
those involving international economic law to those trying to solve problems of the global 
commons, may need to rely on socialization techniques as much as human rights treaties. 
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success of the Genocide Convention in Britain, as in other treaty 
parties. And all three factors should be considered in prescriptions for 
how to improve compliance with this and other human rights regimes. 
Indeed, Goodman and Jinks’s own account of what matters for 
acculturation implicitly accepts a role for such factors. 
Consider, for example, their discussion of the impact of 
organizational membership decisions.9 Although it is plausible (and 
consistent with Goodman and Jinks’s approach) to consider the 
threat of expulsion from certain international organizations or denial 
of credentials for government representatives as relevant concerns in 
securing compliance with human rights norms, such decisions are not 
made in a vacuum without regard to bureaucracies, personalities, or 
positive law. Those familiar with prior attempts to impose such 
sanctions would highlight the role of such bureaucratic factors as the 
rules of procedure within organizations contemplating such measures, 
their prior institutional practices regarding participation rights, and 
their voting rules.10 It is also likely that many of these efforts failed or 
succeeded because of the particular personalities involved—such as 
who controlled the proceedings, applied the rules of procedure, or 
was in a position to “perceive consensus” by the whole. And positive 
law appears likely to have played a prominent role as well. Such 
attempts have been regarded as more or less legitimate depending on 
whether the organization’s charter expressly anticipated expulsion or 
suspension of membership, or whether the organization’s legal 
counsel opined that in a particular factual context, the expulsion of a 
member or denial of its government’s credentials was consistent with 
institutional practice. Certainly the history of such attempts suggests 
that such measures are usually not pursued (except in notorious 
outlier cases such as South Africa during apartheid) when they are at 
odds with positive law and therefore regarded by others as ultra 
vires.11 
The law has also structured the type of membership sanctions 
that have been undertaken. When Serbia and Montenegro sought to 
“succeed” to the UN seat of the former Yugoslavia (as it was quite 
 
 9. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 646–55. 
 10. See, e.g., FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR 
LEGAL SETTING (2d. ed. 1993), at 585–616 (discussing the impact of such factors on decisions 
within the UN General Assembly and in UN Specialized Agencies to attempt various types of 
membership sanctions with respect to Israel or apartheid-era South Africa). 
 11. Id. 
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plausibly entitled to do under existing law of state succession), human 
rights concerns prevented this outcome. At the same time, however, 
the organization did not want to deviate from its institutional 
practices or the relevant law on state succession. The result was an 
awkward act of creative lawyering, by which Serbia and Montenegro’s 
UN representatives were denied the right to vote in the UN General 
Assembly, and ultimately to participate in the Security Council, but 
were not otherwise denied UN participation rights.12 As this suggests, 
proponents of socialization need to consider the roles of law and of 
lawyers—both within institutional actors such as the UN as well as 
within nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and states. While not 
all states are likely to take as legalistic an approach as did Britain with 
respect to the Genocide Convention, the extent to which such foreign 
policy decisions involve lawyers is an important variable in studies of 
compliance.13 
Simpson’s case study raises more general questions about 
Goodman and Jinks’s inquiry into whether and how states socialize. 
The rest of this Response addresses other gaps in their framework 
suggested by Simpson’s account. 
Time Lag  If it took twenty years, as noted, for acculturation to 
work on a liberal law-abiding state such as Britain, the fact that states 
may be ultimately socialized into accepting human rights may not 
provide much solace for policy makers interested in the here and 
now. Goodman and Jinks say little about the time it may take for 
 
 12. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); 
G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 7th plen. mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992). 
Even this instance, a rare case in which membership sanctions not explicitly authorized by treaty 
were imposed, involved considerable activity by UN lawyers to confine the scope of the 
measures sought to be imposed and limit the damage of the legal precedent set by this arguably 
“ultra vires” action. See Consequences for Purposes of membership in the United Nations of the 
Disintegration of a Member-State—General Assembly Resolution 47/1 and Practical 
Consequences of its Adoption, 1992 U.N. Jurid. Yb. 428, UN Doc. A/47/485 (providing the legal 
opinion of the Secretariat of the United Nations on how the breakup of Yugoslavia affects the 
UN membership of the successors of that state). 
 13. Simpson’s account also implies that those interested in compliance need to consider the 
role and influence of lawyers, and not only whether, for example, the state involved is a 
“liberal” or “democratic” state. The extent to which a state “legalizes” its relevant foreign 
policy decisions appears to have an impact on a state’s decision to ratify a treaty and presumably 
has an impact on whether steps are taken to implement a treaty upon ratification. Simpson’s 
case study suggests that, at least in some cases, democratic states that take a legalistic approach 
to such questions might face greater impediments to expeditious ratification, in contrast to the 
assumptions made by some liberal theorists. See generally Simpson, supra note 4. 
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socialization to work or, depending on its causal gateways, whether 
there are concrete ways to expedite the process. Few are likely to be 
attracted to prescriptions based on acculturation if the time needed to 
achieve compliance exceeds the life span of those making them. 
Missing Dynamics  Goodman and Jinks acknowledge that in the 
real world their three models of compliance interrelate or link up in 
dynamic fashion. This raises a question, however, about the 
usefulness of their ideal types.14 Although their threefold mechanisms 
may be analytically useful conceptualizations of how the process of 
compliance works, these ideal types may be considerably less useful 
in describing real-world events—where too many factors and 
personalities come into play and observers are left with a confusing 
muddle in which everything matters, at least a little bit.15 For the same 
reasons, their ideal types may not be particularly useful to designers 
of human rights regimes or compliance mechanisms. As Simpson’s 
account confirms, the real-world practice of states is messy. Worse 
still, at least for trying to model states’ behavior, units within states, as 
well as states acting as collectives, engage in dynamic learning. The 
problems raised by dynamic learning—where actors rarely if ever find 
themselves in the same position twice and constantly evolve their own 
 
 14. As Professors Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders acknowledged long ago, Weberian 
ideal types are conceptual abstractions from reality that are sufficiently general that they cannot 
capture the whole of any actual phenomenon. An ideal type is a useful analytical yardstick for a 
generalized statement precisely because it is “a stylized construct that represents the perfect, 
and thus unreal, example—it is not the average case; it is the pure one.” RICHARD LEMPERT & 
JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 (1986). What makes ideal 
types so useful simultaneously limits their relevance to describing real historical events—such as 
Britain’s consideration of the Genocide Convention at particular moments in time. 
 15. Thus, one of the most thorough efforts to gauge the level of compliance with respect to 
multilateral environmental treaties, by Professors Harold K. Jacobson and Edith B. Weiss, 
concluded that the level of states’ compliance is affected by the characteristics of the activity 
involved (the number of actors involved, the effect of economic incentives, the role of 
multilateral corporations in the activity, and the concentration of activity in major countries), 
the characteristics of the accord (the perceived equity of the obligations, their precision, 
provisions for obtaining scientific and technical advice, reporting requirements, other forms of 
monitoring, secretariat, incentives and sanctions), the international environment (whether the 
treaty was the subject of a major international conference or of worldwide media attention, the 
presence of international non-governmental organizations), as well as factors involving the 
country. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing 
Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 511, 511–542 (Edith Brown Weiss & 
Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998). The very thoroughness of this study—the comprehensiveness of 
its list of compliance factors—poses a challenge for those seeking to draw practicable 
prescriptions from it. 
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reactions in response to others—get a nod in Goodman and Jinks’s 
account but nothing more.16 
Missing Actors  For an account that focuses on socialization, 
Goodman and Jinks’s approach is oddly depopulated. They have little 
to say about the actual people who are supposed to be engaged in 
“mimicry,” worried about being shamed, or seeking to achieve 
substantial affective returns (“cognitive comfort”).17 Their view of 
acculturation relies on what some might see as pop psychology. Their 
actors are driven to conform, to act consistently with their identity 
and social roles, and to enjoy the psychological benefits of group 
norms and expectations. These actors are propelled by social 
pressures and back-patting. But if this is pop psychology, it is pop 
psychology without people. Although acculturation relies on “target 
actors” that presumably include everyone from government 
bureaucrats to the heads of NGOs, the high level of generality with 
which all of them are described make them as opaque as the black 
billiard balls that realists call “states.” 
In common parlance, states (or “organizations” in the abstract) 
do not “socialize”; people do. Even assuming that Goodman and 
Jinks are right—that isomorphic tendencies across common 
organizational structures exist, including among states, and that 
somehow these tendencies manifest themselves through forms of 
collective action not dependent on the conscious actions of 
individuals—in the end, socialization requires someone to act. Surely, 
if the object is to determine whether individuals (as opposed to the 
abstractions for which they work) socialize, factors such as who the 
people within these organizations are, the characteristics of the 
bureaucracies in which these actors perform, and these individuals’ 
connections to relevant epistemic communities elsewhere matter a 
great deal. 
 
 16. Compare, in this respect, the work of those who study the “interactional processes” of 
managerial environmental treaty regimes. Such regimes would also appear to share some of the 
enforcement challenges faced by human rights regimes and also appear to rely on, at least in 
part, socialization compliance techniques. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-
Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2002) 
(noting that “states may be most inclined towards less formal procedures when patterns of 
practice and shared understandings have solidified” and that “interactive processes . . . take 
shape gradually” to increase compliance). 
 17. Id. at 645. 
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Persuasion Matters  Simpson’s case study also raises doubts 
about the extent to which relevant government actors ever act 
without some “active assessment of the merits of a belief”18—what 
Goodman and Jinks call “persuasion.” Goodman and Jinks’s 
conception of acculturation emphasizes the need to conform without 
thought, through tacit processes not involving an assessment of the 
content of the message. It assumes that target actors are unthinking 
mimics and that acculturation occurs for its own sake, not because of 
an assessment of the merits of doing something but because of the 
social relation between the target audience and some group.19 
Goodman and Jinks presume that sometimes states will decide to stop 
torturing people or sign the Genocide Convention because everyone 
else is doing it; that is, not because of a “second-order” calculation of 
the specific costs and benefits of a failure to conform but because 
conforming and belonging themselves provide cognitive comfort. 
They presume that states sometimes act like trendy teenagers 
unthinkingly following the latest fad. But for legalistic societies and 
for all but the most routine decisions, my suspicion is that something 
closer to what they call “persuasion” (or “coercion”) is necessary. If 
Simpson’s account is correct, even with respect to largely symbolic 
acts like ratifying the Genocide Convention, government officials 
stress the very type of specific costs and benefits that Goodman and 
Jinks imply have “second-order” significance. I suspect such 
calculation of benefits is all the more true for decisions subject to 
sharply defined short- and long-term costs: like a commitment to 
prevent torture or cruel treatment in a state’s prisons, even though 
this will require considerable adjustment of police training, the 
establishment of independent ombudsmen, adjustment of national 
priorities, and much else. 
And What About Effectiveness?  As Simpson’s case study 
suggests as well, many occasions of isomorphism may be purely 
symbolic, revealing little about actual compliance with human rights 
by states (or by other actors such as multinational corporations). 
While one might agree with Goodman and Jinks that in some cases 
states, as members of world society, follow “global scripts,”20 the 
authors fail to articulate the conditions that determine when or if 
 
 18. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 1, at 642–43. 
 19. Id. at 643. 
 20. Id. at 652–53. 
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following a global script amounts to something more. That states 
socialize fails to give us answers to the questions that presumably 
inspired Goodman and Jinks’s theory of acculturation. (Indeed, the 
initial draft of their article asked at the outset a set of questions that 
their final version purports to answer: namely, whether international 
law can help to substantially reduce human rights violations, whether 
such regimes need to include enforcement mechanisms to be 
effective, or whether, on the contrary, abstract consideration of 
legitimacy and shame can induce governments not to oppress their 
citizens.) 
But the final version of Goodman and Jinks’s article does not 
ultimately reveal much about whether the legal manifestations of 
acculturation—such as human rights treaties—actually reduce human 
rights violations. They do not explain when or why a state moves 
from following a global script to taking it seriously: how ratification 
changes to implementation and ultimately to full compliance and 
effectiveness.21 If acculturation (or any other general compliance 
theory) is to answer such questions, it needs to address, with a great 
deal more precision, the structural, cultural, or other impediments 
that prevent states from getting to these latter steps. Acculturation 
theory needs to provide a more satisfying explanation than that 
effectiveness depends on “political will.” Without attention to such 
details—the strength of narrower or more tightly focused work on 
compliance such as Dean Koh’s emphasis on transnational litigation 
as encouraging the internalization of norms22—acculturation appears 
to be an elegant potential explanation for why states ratify human 
rights treaties, particularly if they belong to organizations where such 
ratification is expected. It does not say much, however, about why a 
state would go beyond such symbolic acts to actually prevent its 
agents or others within its jurisdiction from, for example, engaging in 
forced disappearances. For the same reasons, a compliance approach 
that does not concretely address implementation or effectiveness 
issues is less likely to be able to distinguish mere coordination games 
(where acculturation without persuasion or coercion might most 
plausibly occur) from cases involving something closer to prisoners’ 
 
 21. On the distinction between implementation, compliance, and effectiveness, see 
generally Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 15. 
 22. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2649 (1997) (book review). 
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dilemmas (in which the temptation to cheat may require forms of 
persuasion or coercion).23 
Do States Think They Are Socializing?  Simpson’s case study 
raises a question about how Goodman and Jinks characterize 
acculturation. I do not believe, based on Simpson’s account, that the 
British government officials involved would have described what they 
were doing as mimicry or any other form of social capitulation. Their 
own self-understanding, as well as how I believe they would describe 
their rationales to others, would emphasize other factors. Most would 
probably explain their actions in terms of advancing the interests of 
Britain or of its people, and I suspect that many other government 
actors would explain to themselves and to their constituencies their 
adherence to other human rights regimes in comparable terms. If 
Goodman and Jinks are describing processes that are hidden from the 
actors themselves or only become apparent from a distance, they 
need to provide a better explanation of why unconscious socialization 
is likely to occur (or is likely to persist even after scholars point out 
the phenomenon). If, on the other hand, their account of socialization 
presumes that in some cases government actors are deceiving 
themselves (or purposely lying to relevant constituencies), it would be 
helpful to examine why. (Perhaps because an explanation based on 
rational costs and benefits is less likely to be politically controversial 
than a decision presented as an act of mimicry?) Explaining the self-
understanding of relevant government officials is important for three 
 
 23. Goodman and Jinks also need to say more about how their concept of socialization 
relates to or differs from the work of political scientists working on comparable terrain. See, e.g., 
AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
APARTHEID 29–33 (1995) (describing states’ concern for reputation); Jeffrey T. Checkel,  
The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POLITICS 324, 344–45 
(1998), (book review) (describing “social learning” as a process whereby actors acquire new 
interests and preferences through interaction with a broader institutional context of norms or 
discursive structures in the absence of obvious material incentives); Thomas Risse & Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practice: 
Introduction, in THE POWER OF PRINCIPLES 1, 11–12 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) 
(describing the socialization of norms through dialogue, communication, and argumentation); 
Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L SECURITY 71, 73 (1995) 
(distinguishing compliance based on coercion, cost-benefit analysis, and determinations that the 
norm is “legitimate,” and suggesting that only in the latter instance are actors’ identities 
“constructed” by the norms). While these other scholars would apparently agree with Goodman 
and Jinks that states indeed “socialize,” it would appear that there is some dispute about how 
this phenomenon takes place: through norm internalization, learning, concern for status, or as 
the product of discourse. The subtle distinctions between these accounts of socialization may 
suggest different prescriptions. 
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reasons: to achieve accurate description, to avoid prescriptive risks, 
and to avoid paradoxical contradictions. The first goal is one that 
Goodman and Jinks share, and not much else need be said: accurate 
description is what, after all, they are hoping to achieve. 
The risks resulting from Goodman and Jinks’s prescriptions need 
more explication. Professor Michael Reisman posits that in the post-
9/11 era the West now faces a clash of civilizations. The West’s 
insistence on conformity to western views of core human rights 
values—human dignity, respect for separation of church and state, 
respect for sexual autonomy and so on—is perceived by those in the 
Islamic world as a threat to their own core values.24 These perceptions 
have a solid basis in fact. Since the end of the Cold War, global scripts 
have increasingly reflected the West’s long-standing views of human 
rights, along with their limitations. As many have noted, prevailing 
views of human rights, at least as institutionalized in global 
institutions, favor the West’s priorities in crucial respects.25 Civil and 
political rights receive more attention (and the greater part of 
enforcement efforts) than the economic, social, and cultural rights 
that are favored by many developing countries (or at least have been 
in the past). The West’s international financial institutions (such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) and 
regional banks (like the European Development Bank) take an 
approach to the rule of law and human and social values that 
presumes certain familiar roles of government vis-à-vis the market, 
values privatization and entrepreneurs, and identifies property rights 
(and even free trade) with individual freedom. Even organizations 
with universal membership, such as the UN, and their officials, like 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, increasingly identify respect for 
human rights with forms of democratic governance long favored by 
the West. 
 
 24. W. Michael Reisman, Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of September 11, 6 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV L.J. 81, 83–84 (2003). 
 25. See, e.g., Sundhya Pahuja, ‘This is the World: Have Faith’, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 381,  
382–90 (2004) (book review) (questioning whether the growing convergence of accepted human 
rights norms can ever be anything other than imperialistic). But see Amitav Acharya, How Ideas 
Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239 (2004) (arguing that local actors do not passively act out a 
universal moral script but selectively borrow and adapt transnational norms in accordance with 
pre-constructed local normative beliefs and practices). 
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While these institutions’ achievement in getting most states to 
don Thomas Friedman’s “Golden Straightjacket”26 might suggest that 
the war to secure global agreement on universally recognized human 
rights scripts has been won, Reisman suggests that despite the 
enormous stakes, the West’s victory is not assured.27 An academic 
theory that stresses that states are driven to conform with human 
rights may exacerbate rather than lessen the charge that Western 
regimes and institutions are vehicles for neocolonialism or the 
imposition of the hegemonic powers’ “soft power.”28 For this reason, 
acculturation as presently described may not in the end advance 
Goodman and Jinks’s ultimate goals as much as they would like. It is 
not at all clear that the best route to getting state actors to be more 
fully and genuinely engaged with human rights regimes lies through 
an implicit affront to their sovereign pride and autonomy; that is, 
through mechanisms for compliance based on the premise that states 
act or should act like unthinking teenagers socially opting for the 
latest fad. 
Finally, there is a fundamental paradox in suggesting that the 
essential element of compliance with human rights—including the 
right to autonomous decision-making as individuals in a democratic 
society—is the pressure to assimilate. Once society achieves a certain 
minimum core of rights protection—such that persons’ rights to life, 
health, shelter, and core respect for human dignity are respected—the 
goal of the human rights movement has been to stimulate and 
enhance personal autonomy so that people are free not to mimic the 
West or to conform. I worry about the expressive values of a theory 
of human rights compliance that relies on unthinking conformity as 
the route to achieving greater personal autonomy and freedom. 
 
 26. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 101–11 (2000) 
(discussing the pressure that the Western world has put on non-Western countries to conform to 
Western economic and political norms). 
 27. Reisman, supra note 24, at 85–86 (discussing the objectives of Al Qaeda as including 
the establishment of a second Caliphate to revive “the old glory of Islam,” and the 
consequences of such a future: namely the “suspension of the vision of a global community 
based upon a common conception of human dignity”). 
 28. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 8–12 (2002) 
(describing the United States’ “soft power”). 
